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Abstract
In a previous paper, Trading Up Kyoto: A Proposal for Amending the Protocol, I argued that
not only do international trade rules, specifically the operation of the World Trade Organization
(”WTO”) agreements, hinder international climate change treaty negotiations, but also that applying exceptions to circumvent trade rules is doctrinally difficult and normatively unsettling, primarily because of WTO jurisprudence, the colorable intent of nations that are violating WTO rules in
the guise of mitigating climate change, and the challenges to creating environmental exceptions
to trade rules to facilitate emissions reduction. To illustrate this point, I focused on ongoing trade
disputes involving a few renewable energy subsidies through which some nations are apparently
seeking to reduce their emissions. I then argued that an effective climate change treaty should
counteract the impact of trade and trade rules. In this Article, I argue that nations should negotiate
a plan to phase out harmful subsidies, particularly fossil fuel subsidies. The idea of eliminating subsidies is not new. It has been considered an important solution to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, and one that can complement WTO rules. This Article adds another dimension to this
solution, i.e. leveraging subsidies within the new climate change treaty to encourage multilateralism. Multilateralism is essential to address the leakage and competition problems arising from
the nonparticipation of all major greenhouse gas emitters. Effective unilateral measures to counter
leakage violate WTO rules. I argue that nations can counteract this problem by incorporating into
the new climate change treaty a mechanism to phase out harmful subsidies in exchange for a right
to provide beneficial subsidies as one policy tool that would promote climate change mitigation
efforts significantly. This proposal would complement, and not replace, existing provisions; would
comply with WTO rules; would mimic other international environmental treaties, notably CITES,
the Basel Convention, and the Montreal Protocol, which have addressed tensions between trade
and an environmental problem by incorporating trade measures within the treaty.
KEYWORDS: Climate change; Kyoto Protocal; Subsidies; WTO; Leverage; Climate Change
Treaty
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negotiations, but also that applying exceptions to circumvent trade
rules is doctrinally difficult and normatively unsettling, primarily
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treaty to encourage multilateralism. Multilateralism is essential to
address the leakage and competition problems arising from the nonparticipation of all major greenhouse gas emitters. Effective
unilateral measures to counter leakage violate WTO rules. I argue
that nations can counteract this problem by incorporating into the
new climate change treaty a mechanism to phase out harmful
subsidies in exchange for a right to provide beneficial subsidies as
one policy tool that would promote climate change mitigation efforts
significantly. This proposal would complement, and not replace,
existing provisions; would comply with WTO rules; would mimic
other international environmental treaties, notably CITES, the Basel
Convention, and the Montreal Protocol, which have addressed
tensions between trade and an environmental problem by
incorporating trade measures within the treaty.
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INTRODUCTION
An important roadblock to negotiating an effective climate
change treaty has been the lack of multilateral cooperation caused by
the tension between some industrialized and industrializing nations.
Industrializing nations such as China and India with currently high
greenhouse gas emissions have rejected binding emissions reduction
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obligations, citing to the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility.1 Industrialized countries, notably the United States,
have refused legal obligations, anticipating that the exclusion of
industrializing nations will cause leakage problems;2 by becoming
havens for industries to relocate; by providing markets for regulated
products such as coal and fossil fuels;3 and by producing high carbonemitting goods for countries where such production is regulated.4
Leakage occurs when emissions in a particular sector increase in
another jurisdiction because of regulation of emissions of that sector
in a particular jurisdiction; in other words, a displacement of an
activity that increases emissions outside the regulated place. Concerns
about leakage and its impact on competition have led major emitters,
notably the United States, to reject the Kyoto Protocol;5 several
countries have followed suit with regard to the second period of
1. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Mar. 16, 1998, 2302 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol or the Protocol]; Report of the
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its
seventh session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
2. Carbon leakage is: “the ration of emissions increase from a specific sector outside the
country (as a result of a policy affecting that sector in the country) over the emission
reductions in the sector (again, as a result of the environmental policy). When handling this
issue, the aim is to address environmental effectiveness, not industrial policy.” Julia Reinaud,
Issues Behind Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, 3
(Oct. 2008), http://www.iea.org/papers/2008/Competitiveness_and_Carbon_Leakage.pdf
[hereinafter IEA Carbon Leakage Report].
3. See Jeffery Frankel, Addressing the Leakage/Competitiveness Issue in Climate
Change Policy Proposals, in CLIMATE CHANGE, TRADE, AND COMPETITIVENESS: IS A
COLLISION INEVITABLE? 69, 70 (Lael Brainard & Isaac Sorkin, eds. 2009) [hereinafter
Addressing the Leakage].
4. See DUNCAN BRACK, MICHAEL GRUBB & CRAIG WINDRAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 35-37 (2000) [hereinafter BRACK]; IEA Carbon Leakage
Report, supra note 2; Adam J. Moser, Pragmatism Not Dogmatism: The Inconvenient Need for
Border Adjustment Tariffs Based on What is Known About Climate Change, Trade, and China,
12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 675, 689 (2011).
5. The United States did not receive support domestically for signing the Kyoto Protocol,
and it has been hard to pass comprehensive federal legislation because of concerns about
competition. See generally, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (the U.S. Senate unanimously, 950, advised the Clinton Administration not to accept binding obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol unless developing countries undertook comparable obligations); THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GAP ANALYSIS (1998). See also Letter from Robert
N. Burt, Environmental Task Force Chairman, Business Round Table, to President William J.
Clinton (May 12, 1998) (on file with author); Letter from John J. Castellini, President,
Business Round Table, to Senator Chuck Hagel, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (June 21, 2005) (citing loss of competition as a key concern for American
businesses if the United States were to sign the Kyoto Protocol without emerging economies
undertaking similar obligations).
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commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.6 Moreover, if industrializing
countries continue to develop without any checks on their emissions,
the global pool of emissions will increase; unlike in the case of other
types of air pollution, per capita growth is unlikely to reduce
emissions without targeted intervention.7
Removing this roadblock will require a solution that can reduce
leakage and competition concerns, and/or persuade all major emitters
to agree to a comparable emissions reduction policy. Ongoing
negotiations on a new climate change treaty show no signs of having
addressed the problem. The voluntary agreement between the United
States and China to ensure that China’s emissions will peak by 2030
is one such example,8 but this will not ensure that the problem of
leakage will be solved, because such a voluntary agreement does not
automatically translate into a legal commitment to reduce emissions,
and other countries, notably India, are not on board. The negotiating
draft for a new climate treaty to which countries agreed in Lima
similarly rests emissions reduction on voluntary measures.9
Current proposals to address the leakage problem through trade
measures, such as imposing border taxes on goods produced with
high carbon emissions10 and easing barriers to technology transfer,
including tariffs,11 are inadequate for economic reasons, as well as
6. What Doha Did, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/
international/21568355-no-progress-today-slightly-better-chance-progress-tomorrow-whatdoha-did (noting that the meeting did not produce any concrete decision, with some countries
such as Canada, Japan, and Russia withdrawing from the Protocol and those committed to
undertaking modest emissions reduction obligations); UNFCCC, supra note 1.
7. See generally Jeffrey Frankel, Climate and Trade: Links between the Kyoto Protocol
and WTO, ENVIRONMENT (Sept. 2005), at 11-13 (referring to the Review of Economics and
Statistics and stating that there was no evidence that increase in a country’s per capita income
would reduce its emission, and arguing rather that increase in income would increase
emissions).
8. See generally id.
9. U.N. Members Agree Deal at Lima Climate Talks, BBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-30468048.
10. See Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, The Economic and Environmental
Effects of Border Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy, in CLIMATE CHANGE, TRADE, AND
COMPETITIVENESS: IS A COLLISION INEVITABLE?, supra note 3; Jason E. Bordoff,
International Trade Law and the Economics of Climate Policy: Evaluating the Legality and
Effectiveness of Proposals to Address Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns, in CLIMATE
CHANGE, TRADE, AND COMPETITIVENESS: IS A COLLISION INEVITABLE?, supra note 3, at 3537.
11. Thomas L. Brewer, Technology Transfers and Climate Change: International Flows,
Barriers, and Frameworks, in CLIMATE CHANGE, TRADE, AND COMPETITIVENESS: IS A
COLLISION INEVITABLE?, supra note 3, at 105.
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because of their potential to conflict with World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) rules.12 Moreover, efforts to address climate change issues
through multilateral negotiations within the WTO are slow.13 Of
greater concern is the fact that many of these measures are unilateral,
or will be imposed by a few countries against developing countries;
such an approach deters, instead of promoting, international
cooperation on climate change mitigation, which calls for
multilateralism.14
Unilateral efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
promoting renewable energy through subsidies also run into a
problem with WTO rules to the extent that the subsidies affect other
WTO members’ ability to gain market access.15 Ignoring WTO rules
for renewable energy subsidies, or allowing them to be an exception
to WTO rules under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) Article XX is not doctrinally or normatively desirable.16 At
the same time challenges to renewable energy subsidies under WTO

12. See Addressing the Leakage, supra note 3, at 71 (discussing various trade measures,
including proposals by the United States and the European Union, and concluding that these
measures are either unlawful under the WTO rules and/or that they are politically undesirable);
McKibbin, supra note 10, at 1-3, 22-23 (discussing border carbon tax and concluding that they
are not economically optimal tools for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, because the
benefits would be small in comparison to the complexity of administering BCTAs and their
“deleterious effects on international trade”); Bordoff, supra note 10, at 37-54 (discussing
proposals under several U.S. climate bills and concluding that these laws would either
potentially violate WTO rules, or, if structured to be in compliance with WTO rules, be
ineffective in addressing the problem); Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and
Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law, 6 (Duke
University Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. NI WP 07-02, 2007), http://www.
climateactionproject.com/docs/internationaltradelaw.pdf (noting that in certain sectors carbon
leakage occurs and causes increases in emissions, even if some claims may be exaggerated);
Ryan Vanden Brink, Competitiveness Border Adjustments in U.S. Climate Change Proposals
Violate GATT: Suggestions to Utilize GATT’s Environmental Exceptions, 21 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 85, 92-93 (2010) (noting that six U.S. industries could suffer competitive
losses: “petroleum, refining, paper and pulp, nonmetallic mineral products, chemicals and
ferrous and nonferrous metals”).
13. See Chris Wold et. al., Leveraging Climate Change Benefits Through the World
Trade Organization: Are Fossil Fuel Subsidies Actionable?, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 635, 647-49
(2012).
14. See generally Addressing the Leakage, supra note 3, at 76. See also Rep. of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26
(Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992) (Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration stating that countries should
resolve environmental problems through multilateral, rather than unilateral, efforts).
15. See generally Deepa Badrinarayana, Trading up Kyoto: A Proposal to Amend the
Protocol, Part I, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2014).
16. Id.
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agreements do not promote multilateralism and can potentially
unhinge domestic efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.17
Given the challenges to addressing leakage problems through
trade measures, the new climate change treaty must foster multilateral
action, either by encouraging all major emitters to accept comparable,
quantifiable emissions reduction obligations, or by neutralizing the
impact of non-cooperation by all major greenhouse gas emitters, as
other environmental treaties that have faced trade-related challenges
to addressing the environmental problem have done.18 A notable
example is the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer,19 which not only provides a mechanism to eliminate
ozone-depleting substances, but also imposes a ban on trade in ozonedepleting substances with non-Parties unless they comply with
mechanisms similar to those contained in the Montreal Protocol.20
The Kyoto Protocol and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) do not provide such a mechanism, which is
essential to plug the leakage problem. Instead, they echo the language
contained in the GATT,21 to ensure that mitigation measures do not
affect trade.22 The new climate change treaty can, and should, provide
a mechanism to address this problem.
17. See Timothy Meyer, Energy Subsidies and the World Trade Organization, 17 ASIL
INSIGHTS, Issue 22, (2013), at 7-9 (noting that nations whose disputes are challenged, such as
India, are requesting for information on domestic subsidies offered by state and local
governments in the United States, and arguing that were sub-national subsidies to be
successfully challenged before WTO, they would undermine efforts to mitigate climate
change).
18. See BRACK, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that, “[e]ffectively . . . [Multilateral
Environmental Agreements (MEAs)] restrict trade either because the trade itself is causing the
environmental damage, and/or as an enforcement measure, to ensure that the agreement’s
objectives are not undermined by non-participation”).
19. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-10 (1987), 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
20. Id. art. 4(3); see also BRACK, supra note 4.
21. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
22. Article 3(5) of UNFCCC states:
[t]he Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international
economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development
in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to
address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change,
including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
Article 2(3) of the Kyoto Protocol reads:
[t]he Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures
under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the
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One option would be to impose a ban on greenhouse gasemitting substances, in the same manner that the Montreal Protocol
does for ozone-depleting substances, with a ban on trade with nonparties. However, such an approach is likely to fail for several
reasons, among them the fact that too many countries produce and
consume greenhouse gas-emitting substances,23 which would present
an insurmountable collective bargaining problem.24 Moreover, it is
debatable whether a trade ban on fossil fuels would conform to WTO
rules, especially provisions that discriminate among non-parties; this
is an important issue, since developing countries’ rejection of trade
measures within the Kyoto Protocol stemmed from fear that such
measures would constitute disguised protectionism.25
This Article presents another option to promote multilateralism
within the new climate change treaty without violating WTO rules:
leveraging energy subsidies. The idea of leveraging energy subsidies
draws on the dual role of subsidies in affecting climate change
mitigation—subsidies to fossil fuels that affect emissions reduction
goals,26 but remain unchallenged before the WTO; and subsidies to
renewable energy to reduce emissions, but are disputed under WTO
law. If the goal is to mitigate climate change, the opposite should
occur: renewable energy subsidies should remain unchallenged,
whereas fossil fuel subsidies should be challenged. Both scenarios are
hard to envisage. Renewable energy affects competition and market
access, and is an essential domestic policy tool for climate change
mitigation. Fossil fuel subsidies are not only offered by many
countries that may be unwilling to challenge the subsidies for fear of
retaliatory challenges, but also it would be hard to prove violation of
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade, and social,
environmental and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing
country Parties and in particular those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of
the Convention, taking into account Article 3 of the Convention. The Conference of
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may take further
action, as appropriate, to promote the implementation of the provisions of this
paragraph.
23. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, industrialized countries, notably France and
Britain were the two major producers of greenhouse gas emissions. BRACK, supra note 4.
24. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 34 (2007).
25. BRACK, supra note 4, at 18.
26. Wold et al., supra note 13, at 641.
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(“ASCM”)27 in the case of fossil fuel subsidies.28 Nations could solve
this subsidies dilemma by agreeing to allow subsidies to renewable
energy, in exchange for elimination of subsidies to fossil fuels,
especially given the substantial momentum to eliminate fossil fuel
subsidies and efforts to expand renewable energy.
This Article does not attempt to provide details for what would
essentially be a complex political negotiation, nor does it present the
leveraging option as an alternative to other mechanisms under the
Kyoto Protocol. Rather, it argues how a leveraging approach could be
structured to comply with WTO rules, in particular ASCM provisions,
which prohibit subsidies. The Article discusses the idea in three parts.
Part II summarizes the problem with trade-related approaches to
addressing leakage through unilateral solutions. Part III sets out the
dual importance of subsidies in mitigating climate change. It explains
the problem with eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, and the WTOrelated challenges to providing renewable energy subsidies. Part IV
discusses the basic framework for leveraging subsidies. It identifies
core WTO rules that such an arrangement should satisfy to avoid
conflict, and also explains how negotiators can achieve compliance
drawing from some existing international environmental treaties.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE, LEAKAGE, THE LIMITS OF THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL, AND UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES
There is a direct connection between trade and greenhouse gas
emissions.29 Trade increases the scale of economic activities, which
increases greenhouse gas emissions, especially when fossil fuels are
the main source of energy consumption.30 The Kyoto Protocol,
however, does not incorporate trade measures to address this problem.
Instead, it relies on market mechanisms, such as clean development
mechanism and emissions trading, in combination with time-targeted

27. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, Annex
1A, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 355 (1999) [hereinafter ASCM].
28. Wold et al., supra note 13.
29. BRACK supra note 4, at 21-22.
30. See generally Key World Energy Statistics, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, 6
(2015),
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld_Statistics_
2015.pdf (setting out the energy consumption of countries).
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legal obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.31 However, the
Kyoto Protocol has proved inadequate to address the problem,
because originally, China and India were not required to undertake
quantifiable emissions reduction obligations. Consequently, other
major greenhouse gas emitters rejected the Kyoto Protocol, citing
leakage concerns.32 Given the stalemate, scholars and nations have
been exploring alternative, unilateral solutions to stem leakage, but
implementing these solutions presents several problems, as discussed
below.
One proposed solution to address the leakage and loss of
competition problems is the imposition of border carbon tax
adjustments (“BCTAs” or “BTAs”). Border tax adjustments to level
the cost of exports and imports based on differences in fiscal
measures are permitted under GATT Article II 2(a).33 BCTAs would
enable Annex I countries to impose higher taxes on imports from nonAnnex I countries and level the playing field, or “comparative
disadvantage” for regulated domestic goods.34 Several proposed
pieces of U.S. federal climate legislation, as well as European Union

31. KYLE W. DANISH, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME, in GLOBAL
AND U.S. LAW (Michael Gerard ed., 2007); BRACK, supra note 4.
32. BRACK, supra note 4.

CLIMATE CHANGE

33. Valentina Durán Medina & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, A Legal View on Border Tax
Adjustments and Climate Change: A Latin American Perspective, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 29 (2011). The GATT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments (BTA) in its report
adopted the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) definition of
BTA as:
any fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination
principle (i.e. which enable exported products to be relieved of some or all of the tax
charged in the exporting country in respect of similar domestic products sold to
consumers on the home market and which enable imported products sold to
consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing
country in respect of similar domestic products).
GATT WORKING PARTY ON BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS, Reports of the Working Party
on Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/
gattpanels/bordertax.pdf; see, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, A New Agenda for Global Warming,
ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, 2 (July 2006) (suggesting that countries “should prohibit the importation
of American goods produced using energy intensive technologies, or, at the very least, impose
a high tax on them”); see also Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 7-8 (collecting proposals by former
French President, the European Union Commissioner, and others, favoring the imposition of
taxes on goods produced with carbon-intensive technology).
34. Laura Neilsen, Border Carbon Adjustments, The UNFCCC, and WTO Rules, 103
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 369 (2009).

188

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:179

(“EU”) Directives incorporate BCTAs to address the problem of
competitive loss.35
However, imposing BCTAs in a WTO-compliant manner is
challenging. If Annex I nations provide free allowances to domestic
producers, they will violate the non-discriminatory rules of GATT.36
As such, if least-developing countries are excluded, BCTAs will be
discriminatory.37 Discriminatory application of BCTAs also precludes
the application of GATT Article XX exceptions. BCTAs that are
primarily imposed to protect competitiveness will not meet the
“likeness” requirement, i.e. that they should be applied primarily on
products.38 Thus, BCTAs cannot mitigate the problems of leakage and
loss of competitiveness. As such, several administrative hurdles to
administering BCTAs have been identified; these may be hard to
circumvent.39
35. Proposed U.S. federal climate legislation that imposed some of BTCA include:
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act; American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES)
and Waxman-Markey Bill. For a discussion of BTAs or BTA-type measures under these
proposed law, see Medina & Lazo, supra note 33; Doaa Abdel Motaal, “Emissions
Offshoring”: Repercussions for International Trade, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 466
(2011) (discussing Article 10a of the EU Directive proposing the inclusion of importers of
products within the EU emissions trading system to avoid carbon leakage); Joshua Meltzer &
Katherine Sierra, Trade and Climate Change, HARV. INT’L REV. (Dec. 7, 2011) (defining loss
of competitiveness as “loss of market share particularly in carbon intensive products such as
aluminum, cement, and steel imported from countries not facing carbon costs”).
36. See Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 17-23, 41-43 (listing steps towards imposing a legal
BTCA and arguing that carbon taxes or cap and trade-based reduction obligations are more
amenable to WTO-compliant BTCA charges).
37. Ryan Vanden Brink, Competitiveness Border Adjustments in U.S. Climate Change
Proposals Violate GATT: Suggestions to Utilize GATT’s Environmental Exceptions, 21 COLO.
J. INT’L ENVTL. L & POL’Y 84, 92-93, 98, 100-05 (2010) (noting that proposed U.S. federal
climate laws discriminate against de minimis emitters, least developed countries, countries
with comparable emissions reduction law, and countries with whom the United States has
bilateral agreement, and that they violate the national treatment requirement by denying
importers flexibility via a cap and trade market); see also Medina & Lazo, supra note 33
(questioning whether countries measuring domestic industries’ allowances or costs via low
carbon emissions, but that of a foreign manufacturer’s emissions via an industry average
regardless of whether a particular manufacturer’s actual [possibly low] emissions would be
WTO compliant).
38. Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 29; see also Brink, supra note 37, at 98 (noting that
since BTCAs would be based on the country of origin and not on the type of product, they
would be protectionist to the extent they are imposed to preserve competitiveness and not for
environmental protection goals); ROBERT HOWSE & ANOTONIA L. ELIASON, DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE WTO
LEGAL ISSUES, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION AND THE MITIGATION OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 48, 62-63 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2009).
39. Brink, supra note 37, at 99-100 (discussing options under American Climate
Security Act and noting that the hardship in identifying a criteria for imposing taxes;
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Moreover, even GATT-compliant BCTAs violate the Kyoto
Protocol, because they tax developing countries, which are not
required under the Protocol to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions.40 Developing countries oppose the imposition of such
unilateral measures by developed countries as being contrary to
UNFCCC.41 In fact, developing countries successfully opposed
efforts by the United States and the European Union to incorporate
BCTAs within a climate treaty at the fifteenth Conference of the
Parties (“COP”) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen.42
A general ban on imports from countries without a cap and trade
system is another proposed solution. These present similar challenges,
notably:43 establishing criteria to determine which foreign programs
are comparable to the US cap and trade system; calculating “per unit”
allowance; complying with the national treatment requirement under
determining the point of application, when a supplier buys credits instead of the importer; and
applying taxes on non-primary goods to ensure that the measure is effective); see also Charles
E. McLure Jr., A Primer on the Legality of Border Adjustment for Carbon Prices: Through a
GATT Darkly, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 456, 461-62 (2011); Nielsen, supra note 34, at
369 (concluding that if BCTAs are applied to all products, it will create verification problems
and monitoring problems).
40. Nielsen, supra note 34, at 2 (noting that imposing BTCA would violate the structure
of UNFCCC, including its flexibility mechanism and in-built equitable considerations).
41. For instance, China and India have opposed BTCAs and developing countries such
as Chile prefer multilateral solutions to climate change as opposed to unilateral measures;
Chile is involved in energy-intensive copper mining and has more coal-power plants and fears
that BTCAs will affect its competitiveness. See Medina & Lazo, supra note 33, at 33
(collecting responses of China and India against potential BTCAs and their WTO
compatibility); see also Motaal, supra note 35, at 466; Martin Khor & Hira Jhamtani, India,
G77 propose Text Against Trade Protection in Copenhagen Draft, SOUTH BULLETIN (2009)
(discussing the response of China and G-77 countries to a proposal at Copenhagen to
incorporate trade measures within a climate treaty and noting India’s proposed text recording
that unilateral trade measures would violate UNFCCC’s provisions on the principle common
but differentiated responsibility, on trade and climate change and on the correlation between
mitigation action by developing countries and financial resources and technology transfer);
Michael Levi, Trade and Climate Change, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 27, 2009),
http://www.cfr.org/world/trade-climate-change/p19674 (cautioning that Congress should
ensure that trade measures to redress climate change, including border taxes, “don’t
unnecessarily aggravate the external relationships that will be needed [for global
cooperation]”); TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE, FOCUS C, World Development Report 2010,
255, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/5287678-1226014527953/
Focus-C.pdf [hereinafter WD Report 2010] (disfavoring unilateral imposition of border taxes
because “the burden [would] fall disproportionately on developing countries”); HOWSE &
ELIASON, supra note 38, at 69.
42. Medina & Lazo, supra note 33, at 29-30.
43. HOWSE & ELIASON, supra note 38, at 69 (referring to such a proposal by the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and AEP).

190

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:179

GATT, particularly when free allowances are allocated;
distinguishing importers that take comparable measures from those
that do not; and imposing the US system (or another system) as the
benchmark when country-specific needs may be different.44
Incidentally, other comparable measures such as carbon labeling
requirements
would
present
substantial
challenges
to
implementation.45
Legal, diplomatic, and administrative difficulties make BTCAs
or regulatory requirements unattractive for addressing the carbon
leakage problem. BTCAs can also undermine both the international
trading system46 and international climate change agreements. Thus,
BTCAs may have limited application, if any, in the short term, unless
the basic framework of the Kyoto Protocol is changed or unless all
major emitters accept comparable emissions reduction obligations.
An enabling clause generally allows developed countries to
provide preferential treatment to developing countries.47 In the past,
developed countries have used tariff reduction incentives to persuade
developing countries to address certain issues.48 For example, the
United States and the European Union provided preferential trade
treatment to developing countries that agreed to eliminate
communism or international environment or labor treaties.49 The
Global Support Program (“GSP”) is attractive because it allows
discriminatory treatment of member States, so long as the same
advantage is granted to all similarly situated States.50

44. Id.
45. See WD Report 2010, supra note 41 (noting that providing information on the level
of carbon produced throughout the manufacturing process would unduly burden developing
countries and constrain trade, as well as misinform the public, unless the effect of carbon on
the international supply chain has been properly studied).
46. Nielsen, supra note 34, at 369 (concluding that a complex web of carbon taxes can
undermine the trading system).
47. For a brief explanation of the Global Support Program (“GSP”), see Lorand Bartels,
The WTO Legality of the EU’s GSP+ Arrangement, 10 J. INT’L L. 869, 872-73 (2007) (stating
that an enabling clause is usually incorporated in a bilateral agreement that countries enter into
under the WTO).
48. See Michael McKenzie, Climate Change and the Generalized System of Preferences,
11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 679, 685-87 (2008) (noting that China’s industrial sector used 64% of its
energy and that China uses five times more than Japan to reach the same GDP growth partially
because of its investment in high-energy intensive activities).
49. Id. at 685-86.
50. Id. at 687-88 (discussing European Communities [EC] Tariff Preferences dispute, in
which the Appellate Body decided that WTO’s non-discrimination principle applied only to
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Developed countries could engage developing countries in
climate mitigation by providing them tariff preferences in exchange
for commitment to emissions reduction goals. However, the nation
providing GSP must establish that differential treatment supports
“development, financial, and trade needs.”51 Some scholars have
suggested that developed countries should incorporate GSP under
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, even to developing countries that
accept voluntary emissions reduction goals.52
GSP as a carrot appears to be a technically sound strategy,
particularly when it is applied to promote trade in environmental
goods. However, at least three challenges make it an unattractive
option. The first two problems create a vicious cycle that may be
difficult to break.
First, GSP can be made more beneficial if extended to emerging
economies, such as China and India. But, developed countries are
unlikely to grant preferential treatment to their close competitors.
Granting preferential treatment to China or similarly situated
economies could increase the trade deficits of developed countries
such as the United States and is therefore an unlikely solution.
Second, several developed countries have not signed the Kyoto
Protocol because of competition concerns. Developing countries are
unlikely to accept emissions reduction obligations in exchange for
preferential treatment unless developed countries accept emissions
reduction obligations as well. Developing countries may also be
skeptical about competition impacts.

similarly situated countries, i.e. per the Appellate Body “all GPS beneficiaries that have the
development, financial, and trade needs” in relation to the issue in question).
51. Id. at 688 (referring to the Appellate Body decision in EC Tariff Preferences dispute
that the issue regarding which GSP is invoked should be capable of being “effectively
addressed” by tariff preferences, and that a rational connection between the preference and the
issue addressed should be established).
52. Id. at 689-90 (also noting that the system should be limited to signatories of the
climate treaties and that the system could be modeled along the lines of the EU Agreements
regarding drugs and labor and environment standards). The author argues that the requirement
that the preference must address “development, financial, and trade needs” can be satisfied by
pointing to international agreements and other instruments that note that unmitigated climate
change will be an impediment to economic growth. The author also refers to Article 3(4) of
UNFCCC, which states that “economic development is essential for adopting measures to
address climate change,” and notes that this provision can be interpreted to satisfy the
requirement that a rational connection must exist between the tariff preference and climate
action.
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Third, a GSP could be created to facilitate trade in
environmental goods. However, technology transfer obligations are
already incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol, which includes the clean
development mechanism (“CDM”).53 Since developed countries have
accepted an obligation to transfer technology, conditional incentives
may be less attractive to developing countries. Further, as discussed
below, separate WTO negotiations are underway to reduce tariffs for
environmental goods, but present unique challenges.54
Developing countries have proposed to lower intellectual
property rights (“IPRs”) to increase cooperation under the Kyoto
Protocol. This could indirectly and potentially address leakage and
competition problems in the long run, but promote climate-beneficial
technology, thereby reducing global emissions.55 Both UNFCCC and
the Kyoto Protocol recognize the importance of technology transfer;56
at its sixteenth meeting in Cancun, Mexico, COP established a
Technology Mechanism to catalyze the development and transfer of
technology for climate mitigation and adaptation.57
World Trade Organization members also initiated negotiations at
the Doha Trade Round to remove tariffs and lower intellectual
property barriers, such as reducing IPR protection time or mandating
compulsory licensing for environmental goods and technology.58 The
negotiations have stalled for various reasons.59
53. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, arts. 11(2)(b), at 12.
54. Pascal Lamy, Global Problems Do Not Respond To Unilateral Fixes; Copenhagen
Must Be Our Focus, WTO, June 26, 2000, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/
dgpl_29jun09_e.htm.
55. Sunstein, supra note 24; Moser, supra note 4 (noting that without affordable
technology developing nations will have little or no incentive to change their energy
consumption pattern); Neel Maitra, Access to Environmentally Sound Technology in the
Developing World: A Proposed Alternative to Compulsory Licensing, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
407 (2010) (discussing scholarship on facilitating transfer of technology, tracing the
importance of transfer of technology).
56. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1; UNFCCC, supra note 1.
57. The Technology Mechanism of the Convention, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/ttclear/
templates/render_cms_page?TEM_home; see also Brewer, supra note 11, at 93-115
(discussing the challenges to technology transfers and the legal barriers to some proposed
solutions).
58. McKenzie, supra note 48, at 694-95 (noting that developed countries should provide
GSP to environmental goods and services through the Doha round of negotiations); Meltzer &
Sierra, supra note 35 (noting that developing countries seek reduction of intellectual propertybased trade barriers as part of climate negotiations); Lamy, supra note 54 (referring also to
WTO’s Information Technology Agreement, through which participants eliminated duties on
IT products, as a model and advocating the “opening of trade to environmentally-friendly
goods and services in the context of the Doha Round . . . including goods such as wind
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There is no agreement on the criteria for defining environmental
goods; presently there are multiple definitions of an environmental
good.60 Developed countries are skeptical whether all nations will
respect IPR for a short period; Annex I nations rejected efforts to
reduce IPR protection at Doha.61 There is also uncertainty about the
effectiveness of these measures in lowering standards.62
The solution to relax intellectual property protection presents
pragmatic problems, as well. Since IPRs can potentially create
incentives for technological innovation, both businesses and
governments may be unwilling to cede their competitive edge with
respect to certain technology, especially to countries with weaker
legal protections. Moreover, as discussions below demonstrate,
nations are investing in alternative technology to promote economic
growth and hone their competitive edge. It will be hard to contract out
of these goals, without a cohesive international climate treaty.
Thus, unless nations can provide incentives for environmental
goods and technology outside the Doha framework and unilaterally
turbines, solar cooking appliances, and photovoltaic cells. We must make this technology more
accessible to all”); Maitra, supra note 55, at 415-28 (discussing trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights [TRIPs], the issue of compulsory licensing, and its scope in
facilitating the deployment of climate friendly technology); Matthew Rimmer, A Proposal for
a Clean Technology Directive: European Patent Law and Climate Change, 3 RENEWABLE
ENERGY L. & POL’Y REV. 195 (2011) (discussing reports published by the United Nations
Environment Programme [UNEP] and the European Patent Office [EPO] on the linkage
between climate mitigation technology and intellectual property); José Romero & Karine
Siegwart, A SURVEY OF KYOTO TOOLS FOR GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION: SPECULATION ON
POST-KYOTO SCENARIOS, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION AND THE MITIGATION OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 13, 15-16, 19 (Thomas Cottier et al eds., 2009) (noting that developing
countries have sought shorter intellectual property right protection periods for environmental
goods and noting that Doha negotiations were launched to encourage mutual supportiveness
between trade and environment, as well as to catalyze sustainable development as specified in
UNFCCC Article 3:5).
59. WD Report 2010, supra note 41, at 245 (arguing that nations should not wait for
Doha negotiations to facilitate technology transfer, because in the meantime the United States
and the European Union would impose BCTAs); see also Nielsen, supra note 34.
60. Meltzer & Sierra, supra note 35 (citing to the task given to WTO’s Committee on
Trade and Environment in Special Session [CTESS] to identify a list of goods and noting that
it identified six technologies related to renewable energy, energy, efficiency, and storage and
referring to the definition of the UN Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD],
which takes into account the environmental impact of a good throughout its lifecycle,
including production, processing, consumption, and waste disposal,” as well as goods whose
“end use” is to address environmental problems).
61. Romero & Siegwart, supra note 58, at 19; Maitra, supra note 55 (discussing the
challenges to compulsory licensing).
62. Meltzer & Sierra, supra note 35.
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lower tariffs,63 trade law measures to facilitate technology transfer are
not a short-term solution to the leakage and competition problems.
II. THE DUAL IMPORTANCE OF SUBSIDIES IN MITIGATING
CLIMATE CHANGE
This section discusses WTO rules on subsidies briefly. It then
addresses the challenges to addressing fossil fuel and renewable
energy subsidies, with specific focus on WTO rules.
A. WTO Rule on Subsidies: the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures
Subsidies are important tools to shape economic growth, but
they can also foster protectionism and affect market access.64 The
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures65
therefore regulates subsidies. ASCM defines subsidies broadly to
include direct and indirect financial contributions,66 but regulates only
subsidies that are “specific” to an enterprise and confer a “benefit.”67
Unless all three criteria are met, WTO rules will not regulate
subsidies.68
63. HOWSE & ELIASON, supra note 38, at 83-84 (noting that so long as tariff reduction is
transparent and complies with Most Favored Nation (MFN) requirements, nations can reduce
tariffs for environmental goods).
64. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market
Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues, 15 J. ECON.
PERSP. 69, 72 (2001) (generally arguing that the aim of GATT is to increase market access to
exporters by requiring importing countries to change their policies, and which would be
affected if export subsidies were provided); José E. Alvarez, et. al., It’s a Question of Market
Access, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 59 (2002) (arguing that the aim of GATT is to increase market
access by negotiating mutually beneficial terms and protecting against unilateral government
infringement).
65. ASCM, supra note 27.
66. Id. art. 1. ASCM’s definition of subsidies includes, “financial contribution by a
government or any public body within the territory of a [m]ember [a government],” that can be
made in the form of “direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential
direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);” foregone revenue “(e.g. fiscal
incentives such as tax credits);” provision of “goods and services other than general
infrastructure” or goods purchase; direction or payment to a private body to provide the above
incentives, as well as any form of income or price support that affect exports or imports.
67. Id. art. 1.1(b).
68. Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 151,
WTO Doc. WT/DS46/AB/R (adopted Aug. 20, 1999); Appellate Body Report CanadaMeasures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 156, WTO Doc., WT/DS70/AB/R
(adopted Aug. 4, 2000); LUCA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID: WTO
AND EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 108-09, 111 (2010). The Appellate Body noted
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ASCM identifies two types of subsidies: conditional subsidies
and actionable subsidies. Conditional subsidies impose export or local
content requirement conditions on the beneficiary. ASCM prohibits
conditional subsidies.69 Actionable subsidies are not prohibited, but
are disallowed if the subsidies cause “adverse effects to the interests
of other [m]embers,” in the form of “injury to the domestic industry,”
“nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or
indirectly,” or “serious prejudice to the interests.”70 Injury exists when
there is a significant increase in the import volume of subsidized
goods or when they affect the price of “like” domestic products, or
affect domestic producers of such products. Special prejudice exists if
a subsidy effectively: (i) “displace[s] or [impedes] the exports of a
like product of another [m]ember into the market of the subsidizing
[m]ember;” (ii) displaces or [impedes] the exports of a like product of
another [m]ember from a third country market;” (iii) significantly
undercuts the price and competition of a like domestic product in the
same market; (iv) increases the global market share of the subsidized
product more than its average share in the past three years.71 If an
investigation reveals that a subsidy has been granted, the affected
member can initiate consultations with the subsidizing State, which
can provide voluntary undertakings or some other mutually agreeable
solution may be reached.72 If the members cannot resolve their
dispute, the complaining member can proceed to the dispute
settlement process.73 Following the final decision, by a panel or the
Appellate Body, the subsidizing member must either remove the
adverse effect or withdraw the subsidy.74 The complainant may
in these reports that the financial contribution requirement should be read together with the
conferring benefit requirement. Appellate Body Report, United States- Countervailing Duty
Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS), ¶¶ 107, 108,
114, WTO Doc., WT/DS296/AB/R (adopted Mar. 14, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United
States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada IV, ¶ 52, n. 35, ¶ 8.53, WTO Doc., WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 2006)
(noting that subparagraph (iv) identified the actor, but did not expand coverage of financial
contribution beyond that stated in SUBPARAGRAPHS (i)—(iii)).
69. ASCM, supra note 27, art. 3.2.
70. Id. art. 5.
71. Id. art. 6.3 (a)-(d). Further, the ASCM disallows a finding of serious prejudice, where
there may be trade imbalances in the subsidized product due to voluntary or some involuntary
decisions made by the complaining member regarding export or import of the product. See id.
art. 6.7 (a)-(f).
72. See id. arts. 7, 18.
73. Id. art. 7.7.
74. Id. art. 7.8.
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impose countervailing measures in accordance with the ASCM, if the
subsidies are not removed, in accordance with ASCM provisions.75
B. The Challenge with Regulating Fossil Fuel Subsidies
Fossil fuel subsidies run into the billions of dollars,76 even
though it is generally accepted that they deter climate change
mitigation efforts and must therefore be eliminated: the Kyoto
Protocol recognizes the importance of eliminating harmful
subsidies;77 scholars have suggested that elimination of fossil fuel
subsidies should be a subject of trade negotiations within the WTO78
and of international economic institutions,79 and world leaders have
acknowledged the importance of eliminating fossil fuel subsidies.80
The problem is that despite a general consensus that fossil fuels
should be eliminated both from an environmental and trade
perspective, fossil fuel subsidies are not only prevalent but are on the
rise, and challenging these subsidies under the ASCM81 is daunting,
because of the legal requirements that must be met to address the
problem. Establishing a causal link between a subsidy and an “injury”
is a complex process. Investigators must consider numerous factors,82
75. Id. art. 7.9. Part V of the ASCM has detailed provisions regarding the process for
imposing countervailing measures, including calculation of benefits and injury.
76. Int’l Energy Agency, Clean Energy Progress Report 15 (2011).
77. Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol states that Annex I Parties should, depending on their
national circumstance, implement policies or measures to progressively reduce or phase out
“subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors” that are contrary to the “Convention and the
application of market instruments.” Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2, Annex B.
78. See generally Climate and Trade, supra note 7, at 8, 12-13 (arguing that eliminating
fossil fuel subsidies is a win-win solution for climate change mitigation and trade liberation
goals).
79. See Larry Elliott, Scrap Fossil Fuel Subsidies Now and Bring in Carbon Tax, Says
World Bank Chief, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/apr/13/fossil-fuel-subsidies-say-burn-more-carbon-world-bank-president.
80. See Leaders’ Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, Group of 20, ¶ 24, Sept. 24 - 25,
2009,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_
summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf. Two US senators have proposed legislation, End
Polluter Welfare Act, to end subsidies to fossil fuel industry. End Polluter Welfare Act, H.R.
1930, 114th Cong. (2015), http://www.sanders.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EPW_Act_fact_
sheet.pdf.
81. ASCM, supra note 27.
82. ASCM Article 15(4) states:
The examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domestic industry
shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a
bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in output,
sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of
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including factors that cause injury independent of the subsidies.83 A
causal link between a subsidy and material injury must be factually
established and the following factors must be cumulatively
considered: (i) the trade effects of the subsidy; (ii) significant increase
of subsidized imports; (iii) an imminent, substantial increase in
exports to complainant’s domestic market; (iv) “significant
depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices” that will increase
demand for imported goods;” and (v) product inventories.84 A subsidy
that does not cause injury to the domestic industry of the complaining
member is not actionable. Further, the injury should be to a like
domestic product, which may be hard to establish given the fact that
there are only a few fossil fuel producing States, and they are unlikely
to challenge each other’s subsidies for fear of retaliation, and it is
unlikely that a consuming State can establish injury to a like domestic
product.85
C. The ASCM Challenge to Renewable Energy Subsidies
Renewable energy is crucial to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
In an effort to expand renewable energy subsidies, several
governments at the national and sub-national levels have provided
subsidies for their renewable energy industry.86 However, some of the
capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; actual and potential negative effects on
cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or
investments and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been an increased
burden on government support programmes. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one
or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance. Id. art. 15.4.
83. Non-subsidy factors include: volume and prices of non-subsidized imports of
identical products, any changes in demand or consumption patterns, any competitive factors
between foreign and domestic producers, or changes in technology and “the export
performance and productivity of the domestic industry.” Id. art. 15.5.
84. Id. art. 15.7.
85. Wold et. al, supra note 13 (discussing the problem of fossil fuel subsidies and
arguing that in most cases it would be difficult to challenge these subsidies under ASCM, with
the exception of electricity; but the article does not consider the political ramifications of such
challenges).
86. Joel B. Eisen, China’s Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leadership?,
35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 18-33 (2010) (discussing China’s law and
policy); Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, Fire and Ice: World Renewable
Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 125 (2010) (outlining measures taken in the United States to promote renewable
energy); Giovanna Golini, Tradable Green Certificate Systems in the E.U., 26 ENERGY L.J.
111 (2005) (providing an overview of trading systems to promote renewable energy in many
EU member states); Martin Lythgoe, Renewable Generation in Argentina: Past Failures and a
Plan for Future Success, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 263, 306-11 (2009) (discussing Argentina’s
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subsidies have come under scrutiny, as either prohibited conditional
subsidies or actionable subsidies under ASCM.87 There are four
disputes before the WTO dispute settlement—United States against
China,88 Japan and EU against Canada,89 China against the European
Union,90 and United States against India.91 The WTO Panel and the
Appellate Body found in one of the disputes, Canada-Feed-In Tariff
WTO, that the province of Ontario’s subsidies were in violation of the
WTO Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures
(“TRIMs”).92 In China Solar Investigations, the US International
Trade Commission (“ITC”) decided that China’s imports caused
material injury to like domestic products, and therefore the United

model renewable energy law); Joshua Prentice, Making Effective Use of Australia’s Natural
Resources—The Record of Australian Renewable Energy Law under the Renewable Energy
(Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), 1 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y REV. 5 (2011) (discussing
Australia’s energy law on renewable energy and arguing for a better incentive program to
foster growth of renewable energy); Hao Zhang, China’s Low Carbon Strategy: The Role of
Renewable Energy Law in Advancing Renewable Energy, 2 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y
REV. 133 (2011) (evaluating China’s energy law and challenges). In the United States,
legislative or regulatory measure to promote renewable energy takes the form of either Clean
Energy Standards (“CES”) or Renewable Portfolio Standard (“RPS”) or Renewable Energy
Standards (“RES”). To date, 31 states and the District of Columbia have adopted either CES or
RPS to promote a range of renewable and/or alternative energy. Clean Energy Standards, CTR.
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY SOLS., http://www.c2es.org/federal/policy-solutions/
clean-energy-standards (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). Through these legal measures states require
electricity suppliers to purchase a fixed percentage from renewable energy. A chart of
legislation and regulations passed by states is available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/
State%20rps%20aeps%20details.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
With exception of solar and wind energy, which are discussed in this article, the scope of
CES or RPS/RES varies from state to state. A chart of energy sources that states include in
their CES or RPS/RES is available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/State%20rps%20
eligible%20resources.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
87. Badrinarayana, supra note 15.
88. China-Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WTO Dispute DS419, (Dec.
22, 2010), [hereinafter China-Wind Equipment].
89. Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector,
Canada-Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/R,
WT/DS426/R (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Canada-Feed-in Tariffs].
90. European Union and certain member states — Certain Measures Concerning the
Renewable Energy Sector, WTO Dispute DS452 (Nov. 5, 2012) [hereinafter EU-Renewable
Energy].
91. India—Certain Measure relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Dispute
DS456 (Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter India-Solar].
92. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868
U.N.T.S.186 [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
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States government is poised to impose nearly 200% countervailing
duties on wind turbine components from China.93
Even though renewable energy subsidies are beneficial for
climate change mitigation, they are unlikely to qualify for an Article
XX exception under GATT,94 because they are neither the least
restrictive trade measures—particularly conditional subsidies—and
because they are applied in a discriminatory manner.95 Further,
allowing these subsidies within the WTO framework is not desirable
from a normative perspective, because countries seeking them have
not accepted binding obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Yet, it is
undeniable that renewable energy subsides are important to diversify
States’ energy portfolios as part of climate change mitigation efforts.
Such efforts, however, should be undertaken under the new climate
change treaty.
III. LEVERAGING ENERGY SUBSIDIES
This Section presents a broad idea for leveraging energy
subsidies to encourage multilateralism in the new climate change
agreement. It briefly discusses some treaties that have taken a similar
approach, as well as presents arguments as to why such an approach
would be WTO compliant.
A. Trade conflict has been resolved by MEAs
Prior to the negotiation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol,
in cases where an international environmental issue intersected with
trade, nations incorporated provisions within the international
environmental treaty that addressed trade-related matters such as
curbing markets for environmentally unfriendly products, providing
mechanisms to catalyze multilateralism and eliminating free-rider
problems to prevent leakage.96 Three treaties exemplify this approach:
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(“CITES”), the Montreal Protocol on the Depletion of the Ozone
93. U.S.-China Clean Energy Rift Deepens with Wind Tower Countervailing Duty
Announcements, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 6, 2012), http://www.
ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/us-china-clean-energy-rift-deepens-with-wind-towercountervailing-duty.
94. Badrinarayana, supra note 15.
95. Id.
96. BRACK, supra note 4, at 17-18.
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Layer (the “Montreal Protocol”), and the Basel Convention on the
trade in Hazardous Waste (the “Basel Convention”). Each treaty, as
discussed below, addressed the trade-related concerns either by
imposing trade restrictions or by banning trade with non-Parties.
CITES prohibits trade in species listed as threatened with
extinction, and prohibits trade in such species with non-parties.97 The
trade is regulated through a permitting process, and thus non-parties
cannot engage in trade in threatened species without proving that they
comply with a regulatory scheme comparable to CITES. The Basel
Convention regulates trade in hazardous waste by prohibiting trade in
waste among non-parties, unless the non-party can obtain a permit by
showing the existence of a waste management system comparable to
that established under the Basel Convention.98 The Montreal Protocol
sets out incremental phasing out or elimination requirements for
ozone depleting substances, or controlled substances99 that are listed
in Annexes to the Montreal Protocol and that are subject to periodic
amendments. Article 4 addresses potential leakage problems by
controlling trade with non-parties to the Montreal Protocol in the
following ways, among others: it bans import of ozone depleting
substances, or controlled substances, from States that are not party to
the Protocol;100 prohibits export of controlled substances to non-party
States;101 “discourages” export of technology to produce and to utilize
controlled substances to non-party States;102 requires parties to
“refrain from providing new subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or
insurance programmes for the export to States not party to [the
Montreal] Protocol of products, equipment, plants or technology that
would facilitate the production of controlled substances;”103 but does
97. THE CONVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD
FAUNA AND FLORA, http:// www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2015)
[hereinafter CITES].
98. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal art. 4(5), Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126.
99. Montreal Protocol, Article 1(4) defines controlled substances “as a substance in
Annex A, Annex B, Annex C or Annex E to this Protocol, whether existing alone or in a
mixture. It includes the isomers of any such substance, except as specified in the relevant
Annex, but excludes any controlled substance or mixture which is in a manufactured product
other than a container used for the transportation or storage of that substance.” Montreal
Protocol, supra note 19.
100. Id. art. 4(1).
101. Id. art. 4(2).
102. Id. art. 4(5).
103. Id. art. 4(6).
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not restrict trade that could promote directly or indirectly reduce the
controlled substances.104 It also regulates trade with parties that fail to
comply with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol by banning
exports from a non-complying party for all purposes except
destruction of a controlled substance.105 The Montreal Protocol also
provides some countries ten years’ time to comply with the treaty,
based on the levels of their consumption of the controlled
substances.106
B. The New Climate Change Treaty Can Resolve the Trade Conflict
Negotiators of the new climate change treaty should take a hard
look at solutions to environmental problems in previous treaties and
take the approach of managing trade conflicts through the new
climate change treaty.107 To be sure, the trade conflict in the case of
climate change is much more complex and expansive than in any
other international environmental problems, including ozone
depletion. Numerous sectors and sources are involved. Equally
though, the consequences of unchecked carbon dioxide emissions
increase will be catastrophic; more so than in the case of any other
environmental problem. So, nations should focus on controlling trade
in goods that trigger climate change. Fossil fuels, notably oil and coal
are two of the biggest sources of greenhouse gas emissions; they are
also globally-traded commodities. Thus, controlling trade in fossil
fuels can greatly contribute to the goal of mitigating climate change.
This Article does not suggest that negotiators should simply
copy any particular provision from a previous treaty. Indeed, the
traditional approach under previous international environmental
treaties, particularly a ban on trade in the polluting product or a ban
on non-Parties is untenable for several reasons. Given the complexity
of the fossil fuel trade, its production and consumption on a large geopolitical scale, the absence of immediate, viable economic
104. Id. art. 4(7).
105. Id. art. 4A.
106. Id. art. 5.
107. WTO Committee on Trade and Environment Report 1996 notes, “Trade measures
based on specifically agreed-upon provisions can also be needed in certain cases to achieve the
environmental objectives of an MEA, particularly where trade is related directly to the source
of an environmental problem. They have played an important role in some MEAs in the past,
and they may be needed to play a similarly important role in certain cases in the future.”
Comm. on Trade and Env’t, Rep. (1996) of the Comm. on Trade and Env’t, WTO Doc.
WT/CTE/1 (Nov. 12, 1996), at ¶ 173.
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alternatives, and the cost of alternatives, a complete ban is unrealistic,
especially because the implications for major oil-producing States are
so immense that achieving a consensus for a proposal to completely
ban oil production would be impossible to achieve.108
However, parties can incorporate provisions to eliminate
subsidies for fossil fuels within the new climate change treaty. The
Kyoto Protocol currently requires Annex I parties to phase out
“subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to
the objective of the [UNFCCC] and the application of market
instruments.”109 However, despite this provision, subsidies in the
fossil fuel sector persist, and despite pledges made by the G-20 to
eliminate fossil fuel subsidies,110 many countries, including Annex I
States, continue to subsidize fossil fuels.111 Further, efforts to
negotiate terms to eliminate subsidies within the WTO framework
have been extremely slow.112 Negotiating a schedule or firm
framework for eliminating subsidies within the new climate change
treaty would be a better approach. Such an approach is also in line
with the ASCM efforts to eliminate market-distorting subsidies, and
indeed, the Director-General of WTO has expressed the importance of
eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and exploring the linkage between
the WTO laws and fossil fuel subsidies.113
To be sure, such an approach could trigger opposition from
several States, including developing countries and oil-exporting States
that have historically advocated a cautious approach to emissions
reduction policies, and reinforce the leakage problem instead of
solving it. What is necessary is an incentive that would persuade all
major greenhouse gas emitting States to join the “Kyoto Club.”114
108. Sunstein, supra note 24.
109. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. (2)(1)(a)(v).
110. 3rd G-20 Summit Meeting, The Pittsburgh Summit Declaration Sept. 24-25, 2009, ¶
24.
111. Wold et al. supra note 13, at 637-38 (discussing the pledges made by countries at
the G20 meeting, as well as pledges made by countries within the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation [APEC], and concluding that subsidies for fossil fuels continue to rise).
112. See generally Kerryn Lang et al., Increasing the Momentum of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy
Reform: A Roadmap for International Cooperation, INT’L INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
11-12 (2010).
113. See Meyer, supra note 17, at 2 (quoting the WTO Director-General Harshavardhana
Singh).
114. Jagdish Bhagwati, Reflections on Climate Change and Trade, in CLIMATE CHANGE,
TRADE, AND COMPETITIVENESS: IS A COLLISION INEVITABLE?, supra note 3, at 171, (noting
that there is no incentive for all countries to join the Kyoto Protocol, in the same way that there
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One such incentive, at least insofar as certain developing States such
as China and India are concerned, could be a limited pass on subsidies
for the renewable energy sector.
Ongoing disputes before domestic forums and the WTO dispute
settlement bodies regarding the validity of a host of renewable energy
subsidies among major greenhouse gas emitting States signal a policy
towards renewable energy expansion.115 If the new climate change
treaty explicitly permits renewable energy subsidies for a limited
time, and tie it to the phasing out or elimination of fossil fuel
subsidies, it could create an incentive for major greenhouse gas
emitters to join the treaty.
Whether oil-exporting States, notably Middle East nations,
would support such a mechanism is a separate matter. However, since
most oil-exporting States are not major industrial players, their noncooperation is unlikely to trigger leakage concerns. The more critical
concern is the compatibility of a provision permitting renewable
energy subsidies under a climate change treaty with ASCM. On its
face, subsidies to promote renewable energy are likely to be
actionable, if not prohibited.116 However, to the extent that these
subsidies are structured in a manner that they comply with some basic
tenets of WTO rules, they could qualify for environmental exceptions
under GATT Article XX;117 indeed prior to its expiration, ASCM
specifically included non-actionable subsidies, i.e. subsidies to assist
“existing facilities”118 to adapt to new environmental requirements
imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints
and financial burden on firms. ASCM also set out the terms under
which the subsidies: (i) could only be a one-time, non-recurring
measure; (ii) cover only up to 20 percent of the cost, (iii) not cover
any replacement or operational costs; (iv) directly cover of avoiding
nuisance or pollution; and (v) be available to all firms that can adopt
the new technology.119 Moreover, all members had to report such
was an incentive to join GATT and related agreements, despite the absence of short term
incentives).
115. Badrinarayana, supra note 15; Kati Kulovesi, International Trade Disputes on
Renewable Energy: Testing Ground for the Mutual Supportiveness of WTO Law and Climate
Change Law, 23(3) REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL L. 342, 348-50 (2014).
116. Badrinarayana, supra note 15.
117. Id.
118. ASCM, supra note 27, at 239 n.33 (defining existing facilities as those that were in
existence at least two years before the environmental regulation was passed).
119. Id. at 239.
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subsidies to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, and any WTO member could request information on the
subsidies, as well as initiate investigations.120 The new treaty can
similarly incorporate terms to ensure cohesiveness with WTO rules.
Moreover, to the extent that a subsidy appears to violate WTO
rules, a WTO member always has recourse to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism. The situation would be no different from the
Montreal Protocol, under which States ban trade in a product with
non-Parties. However, to date no challenge has been raised under the
Montreal Protocol, despite the discriminatory provision.121
CONCLUSION
Multilateral efforts to mitigate climate change have stalled,
primarily because of leakage and competition concerns arising from
the non-participation of industrializing nations in a time-targeted,
quantifiable emissions reduction scheme. Unilateral solutions to
address the problem have been impeded by WTO rules, or are
inadequate to effectively overcome the problem. Moreover, WTO
rules are also affecting renewable energy subsidies that could foster
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In a previous article, this
author argued that this problem should be addressed within the
framework of a new climate change treaty. This Article, drawing from
literature on the impact of fossil fuel subsidies on greenhouse gas
emissions reduction in conjunction with the opposition under WTO
law to renewable energy, argues that States should incorporate a
mechanism that phases out fossil fuel subsidies, while at the same
time providing an incentive in the form of a limited right to provide
domestic renewable energy subsidies. The detailed architecture of
such a provision is best left to political negotiations. However, given
the fact that most effective multilateral environmental treaties address
trade issues related to the environmental problem within the
environmental treaty, the fact that these agreements have not been
challenged before the WTO, and the fact that the ASCM previously
provided for environmental exceptions, States can leverage energy
subsidies as one tool to promote multilateralism within the new
climate change treaty.

120. Id. at 239-40.
121. BRACK, supra note 4.

